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ABSTRACT 
This research therefore underscores the limits of institutional design and constitutional 
engineering for improving the performance of government auditing. External factors, 
such as the functioning of the national system of fiscal control, the cycle of legislative 
accountability and the balance of political powers, matter greatly. A critical and often 
dysfunctional link is that between the AAA and their main principal, the legislature, as 
mediated by the legislature’s public accounts committee. This functional relationship is 
particularly important in the monocratic and collegiate models of external auditing 
where the autonomous audit agency acts as an advisory body to the legislature, such as 
in Argentina. It is a crucial relationship to enforce ex post government accountability in 
financial matters through the annual certification of public accounts and the discharge 
of government.  
 
GOVERNMENT AUDITING AND CORRUPTION CONTROL 
In the second stage of reform, strengthening external oversight of public finances is a 
defining challenge for emerging economies seeking to foster fiscal responsibility and 
curb corruption. Increasing budget transparency and financial accountability matters to 
safeguard the integrity and improve the efficacy of public spending, so that public 
resources can be more effectively deployed to promote development and reduce 
poverty. It also matters to boost the effectiveness of foreign aid and ensure that aid 




There is thus renewed interest in the institutions of budget oversight and financial 
accountability as a means to enhance external scrutiny of public finances. Our 
understanding of what explains the effectiveness of government financial management 
has considerably expanded. Building on Aaron Wildavsky’s seminal work on the 
politics of the budget process (Wildavsky and Caiden 2003), there is now a greater 
appreciation of the governance and institutional dimensions of public budgeting, in 
particular the role of parliaments (Schick, 2002; Lienert, 2005; Santiso, 2006b; 2005a, 
2005b), autonomous audit agencies and civil society organizations (Ramkumar and 
Krafchik, 2005).  
However, little remains know on what explains the effectiveness of autonomous audit 
agencies (AAA). How effective are they in enforcing financial accountability, 
improving fiscal governance and controlling corruption? How do they insert themselves 
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in the architecture of fiscal control and the political economy of public finance 
accountability? This research notes presents the findings of recent research to assess the 
effectiveness of AAAs and their impact on the quality of fiscal governance in emerging 
economies.  
 
APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT AUDITING 
Government auditing not only matters to detect and deter corruption; it also contributes 
to improve fiscal governance. Effective independent auditing of government finances is 
critical to enhance the credibility of public finances and ensure the probity of public 
administration. AAAs, traditionally referred to as supreme audit institutions, are those 
state agencies tasked with overseeing government finances, providing reasonable 
reassurances on the reliability of government financial statements, and verifying the 
truthfulness of government financial information through their audit reports and 
opinions. They are key institutions of intra-state horizontal accountability, contributing 
to combating corruption and improving public management (O’Donnell 1998). 
Importantly, they examine tax revenues, public expenditures and public debt.
2
  
They verify the government’s compliance with budget rules and financial regulations as 
well as the mandate enshrined in the budget law approved by the legislature through 
legal compliance and financial certification audits. They thus contribute to anchoring 
the rule of law in public finances, including through the imposition of administrative 
sanctions. In fact, in many countries, audit agencies are courts of auditors or tribunal of 
accounts with quasi-judicial powers in administrative matters and jurisdictional 
authority over public administrators, acting as an administrative tribunal.  
Features and functions of AAAs vary across countries and have evolved over time. 
There have also been important changes in approaches to government auditing over the 
past two decades. AAAs have progressively assumed a wide variety of roles, 
broadening the traditional narrow scope of their mandate. In recent years, they have 
taken on new tasks and adopted new approaches to government auditing, which led to a 
fundamental alteration of the model of control in public finances. Modern AAAs 
increasingly emphasize the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public spending 
through performance and value-for-money audits. What is sought is substantial 
compliance with the objectives of the budget and the achievement of results. 
Furthermore, in some countries, audit agencies also perform key anticorruption 
functions, for example through the oversight of asset declarations, ex-ante control of 
public procurement and the oversight of privatization processes. Lastly, in a few 
countries, they are also responsible for auditing the finances of the legislature and the 
judiciary.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT AUDITING 
Different institutional arrangements exist for organizing the external audit function in 
modern states, reflecting different historical trajectories and institutional traditions. 
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There are three ideal types of autonomous audit agencies (Stapenhurst and Titsworth, 
2001):  
• the court model of collegiate courts of auditors or tribunals of accounts with 
quasi-judicial powers in administrative matters often acting as an administrative 
tribunal, such as in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and, in Latin America, Brazil 
or El Salvador; 
• the board model of a collegiate decision-making agency but without 
jurisdictional authority, such as in Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and, in Latin 
America, Argentina or Nicaragua; and 
• the monocratic model of an uninominal audit agency headed by a single auditor-
general and often acting as an auxiliary institution to the legislature, a model 
prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and in Latin America, Chile, Colombia, Mexico or Peru. 
In practice, however, AAAs are unique hybrids that do not fit easily in the traditional 
model of separation of powers. They combine several elements of the different ideal 
models. Key variations between agencies include the timing of control (whether ex-ante 
or ex-post control), its nature (whether emphasizing compliance or performance 
auditing), its effects (the follow-up of audit recommendations), as well as its status (the 
legal standing of audit rulings).  
The most important issue, however, concerns the AAAs’ approach to fiscal control and 
financial accountability. Fiscal control can be preventive, corrective or punitive. 
Compliance control is concerned with the formal adherence with the legal rules and 
financial regulations framing the budgetary process, while performance control is 
concerned with the substantive compliance with the objectives of the budget law and the 
manner in which public resources have been deployed.  
As Speck (2000) aptly underscores, AAA are torn between two concerns: a liberal 
concern for limiting and restraining executive power, which is best achieved through 
ex-ante compliance control,
3
 and a managerial concern with improving public sector 
management, which is best achieved through performance auditing. While both these 
functions are crucial for effective and accountable government financial management, 
the relative emphasis on one or another dimension will depend on the stage of 
development of the budgetary systems as a whole, including the quality of the 
bureaucracy and the prevalence of the rule of law. The trend, however, is towards a 
greater emphasis on the preventive and corrective functions through greater reliance on 
ex-post performance auditing.  
 
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS OF AUTONOMOUS AUDIT AGENCIES 
Government auditing in developing countries and emerging economies is in transition, 
seeking to redefine its contribution to government accountability and fiscal control. A 
key issue concerns the insertion of AAAs in the broader institutional framework of 
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fiscal governance and the separation of powers, in particular their links to the cycle of 
political accountability legislative oversight and judicial control.  
However, little is know on what explains the effectiveness of AAA and how to measure 
it. There is little comparative research on the effectiveness of alternative institutional 
arrangements for fiscal control and government auditing. Furthermore, the impact of 
government auditing on the quality of fiscal governance remains largely understudied. 
Emerging lessons, however, suggest that the performance of AAAs requires 
understanding the political economy of government auditing, in particular the role of 
institutional arrangements and political incentives. The degree of political competition 
and contestation is key, as it is the opposition who has the greatest interest and incentive 
to oversee government (Messick, 2002).  
To better measure the effectiveness of AAAs, we construct an indicator of institutional 
effectiveness in ten Latin American countries along the four key attributes, (i) their 
independence from the executive, (ii) the credibility of audit findings, (iii) the 
timeliness of audit reports, and (iv) the enforcement of audit recommendations. Figure 1 
reproduces the indicator of effectiveness of autonomous audit agencies in ten Latin 
American countries and Table 1 shows how the indicator is constructed.  
This data underlines three issues. First, specific institutional arrangements vary greatly 
within ideal types. Second, governance contexts appear to have greater influence on 
organizational performance. Third, the model of external auditing chosen by a given 
country does not predetermine the overall performance of an AAA. While Ecuador, 
Peru, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile and Colombia follow the monocratic model, they show 
great variation in organizational performance.  Similarly, while Brazil and El Salvador 
follow the court model with quasi-judicial powers, their relative performance differs 
substantially.  
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INDICATOR Independence Credibility Timeliness 
Enforce-
ment 
ARG 0.28 0.44 0.22 0.13 0.33 
BRA 0.63 0.88 0.42 0.24 1.00 
CHI 0.59 0.78 0.40 0.18 1.00 
COL 0.61 0.75 0.46 0.21 1.00 
CRI 0.49 0.66 0.48 0.16 0.67 
ECU 0.28 0.66 0.14 0.00 0.33 
SLV 0.40 0.53 0.08 0.00 1.00 
MEX 0.36 0.59 0.38 0.12 0.33 
NIC 0.42 0.78 0.20 0.03 0.67 
PER 0.32 0.78 0.12 0.04 0.33 
LAC10 0.44 0.68 0.29 0.11 0.67 
Note: Indicator scale from 0 to 1, with lower scores meaning lower performance. 
Source: Author, 2006c 
 
GOVERNMENT AUDITING AND FISCAL GOVERNANCE 
We proceed with ascertaining the impact of AAAs on both (i) fiscal performance and 
(ii) fiscal governance, resorting to simple correlations with different measures of fiscal 
policy and institutional quality. We used as proxy indicators of the performance of 
fiscal policy quantitative and qualitative measures of budget credibility, such as the 
level of deficit, volatility, centralization and transparency of the budget. Proxy 
indicators for institutional quality include the rule of law, bureaucratic efficiency, 
corruption control and constraints on executive power.  
We find that the quality of external auditing has limited explanatory power and only 
indirect influence on fiscal outcomes. It does nevertheless have greater significance for 
the credibility of budget processes measured in terms of fiscal transparency, as shown in 
Figure 2. Surprisingly, external auditing does not appear to be correlated with the 
strength of legislative budgetary powers, which would seem to indicate an important 
disjuncture between external auditing and legislative oversight. In fact, there is greater 
correlation between external auditing and the centralization of budgetary powers in the 
executive (prevalent in Latin American presidential systems of government), which 
would seem to suggest that external auditing is obliged to counterbalance weaknesses in 
legislative oversight and check executive discretion. 
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  Source: Author, 2006c 
However, we find an important link between the external auditing and the quality of 
fiscal governance. Considering the wealth of empirical and statistical research 
underscoring the contribution of governance institutions to economic development, we 
can infer that AAAs have an indirect influence on fiscal performance. The research 
reveals a strong correlation between the credibility of external auditing and the quality 
of fiscal governance, in particular corruption control (Figure 3) and bureaucratic 
efficiency (Figure 4). While correlation is not causation, this data strongly suggests that 
AAA are a core component of the system of fiscal control and government 
accountability in financial matters.  
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The data nevertheless reveals a weaker connection between external auditing and 
adherence to the rule of law and constraints on the executive, suggesting that AAAs 
only marginally contribute to the systems of checks and balances. This latter finding 
tends to confirm that, whilst AAAs could potentially play a critical role in strengthening 
government accountability, they often fail to do so because of structural dysfunctions in 
the system of fiscal control in which they are embedded.  
These results thus point out to systemic failures in government auditing systems. They 
suggest that other factors linked to the broader governance context bear greater 
explanatory power on the relative performance of AAAs across countries and over time. 
Comparative longitudinal case study research carried out in Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
(which represent the three main models for organizing government auditing) carried out 
between 2003 and 2005 suggests that the ultimate effectiveness of AAAs do not 
necessarily nor primarily dependent on the choice of organizational model or the 
strength of the agency taken in isolation (Santiso, 2006c and 2006d). More 
fundamentally, it shows that accountability gaps in budget oversight are caused by 
wider dysfunctions in the systems of fiscal control.  
Skewed political incentives, rather than weak technical capacities, largely explain the 
limited effectiveness of AAAs. For example, in Argentina, the reform of the AAA led to 
its neutralization during most of the 1990s. In 1993, then-president Carlos Menem 
replaced the Tribunal de Cuentas de la Nación (TCN) with the Auditoría General de la 
Nación (AGN), a collegiate body of seven auditors-general focusing on ex-post control 
and reporting to the legislature. Under the previous arrangement, the TCN was a 
collegiate tribunal of accounts headed by five judges. It was endowed with quasi-
judicial powers of sanction and ex-ante control prerogatives, which could effectively 
block questionable executive decrees. It indeed contested several privatization 
procedures initiated by the government in the early 1990s. Under the new institutional 
arrangements, audit findings go through political filtering, both within the audit agency 
itself, as well as in the legislature.  
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This research therefore underscores the limits of institutional design and constitutional 
engineering for improving the performance of government auditing. External factors, 
such as the functioning of the national system of fiscal control, the cycle of legislative 
accountability and the balance of political powers, matter greatly. A critical and often 
dysfunctional link is that between the AAA and their main principal, the legislature, as 
mediated by the legislature’s public accounts committee. This functional relationship is 
particularly important in the monocratic and collegiate models of external auditing 
where the autonomous audit agency acts as an advisory body to the legislature, such as 
in Argentina. It is a crucial relationship to enforce ex post government accountability in 
financial matters through the annual certification of public accounts and the discharge of 
government.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This research confirms that the contribution of AAAs to the fiscal control and financial 
accountability is hampered by structural factors linked to the political economy of 
government auditing, in particular the dysfunctional linkages between government 
auditing, legislative oversight and judicial control (Santiso, 2005a, 2005b, 2006c). 
There are five main conclusions and policy implications for this incipient research.  
First, budget institutions cannot be strengthened in isolation. Dysfunctions in systems 
of fiscal control are systemic, not agency specific. Ultimately, the effectiveness of 
AAAs depends on the broader political economy of executive-legislative budget 
relations in which they are embedded. It also hinges upon the quality of their insertion 
in the national system of fiscal control and budget oversight, what Transparency 
International refers to the ‘national integrity system,’ which include internal control 
systems, government accounting and legislative budget oversight. Therefore, improving 
government auditing required tackling the incentives for inter-institutional cooperation.  
Second, reform strategies based on radical reform or institutional transplant of 
exogenous models are likely to fail. Stages of institutional development cannot by 
bypassed. The radical change of external audit model in Argentina in 1993, which 
changed from the court model to the collegiate model overnight, constitutes an example 
of reform failure. AAAs are path-dependent and are embedded in a particular culture of 
public administration. Gradual approaches based on incremental adjustments and 
piecemeal changes, such as those privileged by the Brazilian Tribunal de Contas da 
União (TCU) since its creation in 1891 (in particular in 1964 and 1988), are likely to 
bear greater, more sustainable results. These findings underscore the limits of 
institutional design and institutional import as effective reform strategies. While radical 
reform is sometimes warranted, it requires carefully crafted and politically astute reform 
tactics, both in the design and implementation of the reforms considered. More 
importantly, it requires moving away from erstwhile technical approaches to 
institutional reforms.  
Third, it is necessary to enhance the institutional and functional linkages between 
autonomous audit agencies and the other components of the systems of fiscal control. 
The effectiveness of AAAs, as ‘pillars of integrity’ (Dye and Stapenhurst, 1999), largely 
depends on the quality of their insertion in the national systems of integrity. This, in 
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turn, requires a adopting a systematic view of fiscal control and financial accountability 
in which the linkages between organizations matter inasmuch as the performance of 
agencies in isolation. Three linkages are of critical importance: (i) with the legislature to 
enforce political accountability, (ii) with the judiciary to enforce judicial accountability 
and (iii) with civil society to enforce societal accountability. Improving these inter-
institutional linkages is likely to enhance external scrutiny of government finances.  
More effective linkages between AAAs and parliamentary oversight committees, in 
particular public accounts committees, are of utmost importance (Santiso, 2006b, 
2005a, 2005b, 2004b; Stapenhurst et al., 2005).
4
 There is indeed a symbiotic relation 
between external auditing and legislative oversight of public finances, a relation that is 
severely dysfunctional in many developing countries. Similarly, more efficacious links 
between civil society and oversight agencies are likely to bear significant results 
(Ramkumar and Krafchik, 2005). 
Fourth, institutional independence is not an end in itself but a guarantee of 
impartiality and credibility. Therefore, independence ought to be approached as a 
continuous rather than a dichotomous variable. Indeed, this research note reveals a 
paradox of independence: while AAA ought to be sufficiently autonomous to act 
independently, they need to develop effective functional relations with those institutions 
tasked with enforcing government accountability. The Chilean Contraloría General de 
la República (CGR) is a highly independent and respected institutions, often compared 
the ‘fourth power of the state.’ However, by insulating and isolating itself in the Chilean 
architecture of fiscal governance, it fails to fully exploit opportunities to enhance its 
impact through a more efficacious relationship with the legislature and the judiciary.  
Fifth, conceptually, it is important to distinguish more sharply oversight agencies 
from accountability institutions. There is considerable debate in the accountability 
literature on the importance of enforcement and sanctions and the role of oversight 
agencies. There is considerable debate in the accountability literature on the role of 
oversight agencies and the importance of enforcement and sanctions. They are legally 
empowered to directly enforce accountability on the executive. In contrast, oversight 
agencies, such as AAAs, cannot directly enforce accountability on the government, as 
‘agents cannot hold other agents accountable, only their principals can’ (Moreno et al., 
2003:117). They are generally auxiliary bodies to accountability institutions, either the 
judiciary (in the court model) or the legislature (in the two other models). Oversight 
agencies, it is suggested, can only enforce accountability indirectly by referring the 
cases to accountability institutions. Their main contribution is, therefore, to support the 
accountability functions of the legislature and the judiciary.  
This research thus underscores the critical links between external auditing, legislative 
oversight and judicial control. It invites further inquiry into the political determinants of 
the effectiveness of those formal and informal institutions tasked with overseeing 
government and controlling corruption. More fundamentally, it underscores the critical 
need to increase demand for accountability, from both formal and informal institutions, 
as well as civil society and the media, to effectively dent corruption. Further research is 
in particular needed into the political and institutional determinants of the role of 
parliaments in the oversight of the budget. Strengthening the institutions of legislative 
budget oversight and the agencies of public finance integrity is undoubtedly a structural 
challenge for Latin American emerging economies. It is nevertheless a critical one.  
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 This latter dimension is particularly important, as donor governments have committed, 
in 2005, to increase aid flows and enhance donor harmonization, in particular through 
direct budget support and policy-based lending which entail placing greater reliance on 
developing countries’ financial management systems (Santiso, 2006a, 2006b, and 
2004a). 
2
 It is important to underscore that AAAs scrutinize public finances in their entirety, 
including revenue. Thus, in theory, they contribute to deter fiscal corruption in revenue 
agencies and taxation systems, such as tax evasion, elusion and exemptions (Fjeldstad 
and Tungodden, 2003). 
3
 Furthermore, with ex-ante control and the capacity to question or annul illegal 
administrative acts, the autonomous audit agency becomes a ‘veto player’ in the budget 
policymaking process (Tsebelis, 2002). 
4
 AAAs in the monocratic and collegiate are institutionally and functioning linked to 
parliaments in the exercise of their oversight functions, in particular through the annual 
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